Does Financial Distress Risk Drive the Momentum Anomaly? by Agarwal, Vineet & Taffler, Richard J.
1Financial Management, 2008, Volume 37, Number 3, Pages 461-484
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This paper brings together the evidence on two asset pricing anomalies – continuation of
prior returns (momentum) and the market mispricing of distressed firms, using UK data. Our
analysis demonstrates both these effects are driven by market under reaction to financial distress
risk. In particular, we find momentum is proxying for distress risk, and is largely subsumed by
our distress risk factor. We also find, as with U.S. studies, no evidence that size and B/M effects
in stock returns are linked to financial distress.
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2I. Introduction
Market pricing of distress risk has attracted a lot of academic interest since the financial
distress factor hypothesis of Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992) attributed
higher returns to small stocks and value stocks to firms being relatively distressed.1 If risk of
financial distress is pervasive and missed by the standard CAPM, we would observe either a
positive or negative risk premium on distressed stocks. A positive risk premium would exist if
distress risk is correlated with other factors, such as size and book-to-market (B/M), but is
missed by the market factor or the market over reacts to bankruptcy risk. A negative risk
premium would be observed if investors under react to risk of failure leading to the stock prices
of such firms not being discounted sufficiently or due to lower systematic risk. If the market does
under react to bankruptcy risk, distressed firms will have low prior-year returns. These low
returns will continue for some time into the future generating a negative financial distress risk
premium and continuation of prior returns (momentum). This paper specifically tests whether
momentum proxies for distress risk in the UK. Significantly, such a financial distress explanation
for the continuation of the prior returns anomaly has not been explored in the literature to date.
The existence of medium-term continuation of stock returns (momentum), the most
challenging of all anomalies (Fama, 1998), is well established (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993,
2001; Liu, Strong, and Xu, 1999). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and other studies (Daniel
and Titman, 1999; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000) argue momentum is driven by market under
reaction to information. According to Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), investors are slow
to update their beliefs in response to new public information leading to under reaction. This
under reaction generates positive autocorrelation in stock returns. Beaver (1968) is one of the
1 Following Fama and French (1993, 1995), we define the term distress factor as representing individual firm
financial distress. As such, we use the terms financial distress and bankruptcy risk interchangeably.
3first to demonstrate that subsequently bankrupt firms under perform the market for up to four
years prior to bankruptcy, and particularly during the last year. This suggests that the market is
anticipating, but not fully incorporating (i.e., under reacting to), the deteriorating financial health
of a firm. Distressed firms, therefore, experience lower past realized returns. Hong et al. (2000)
and Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) find most of momentum profits come from the returns
continuation of poor performers. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2006) indicate that prior-year
return is a significant predictor of subsequent bankruptcy. This implies momentum is capturing
financial distress risk, an important issue not directly addressed in the existing literature. Hence,
if the market under reacts to the poor solvency position of firms, we should find that: 1)
distressed stocks earn lower returns than non-distressed stocks as the market slowly realizes its
error and drives down distressed stock prices, and 2) medium-term continuation of returns is
driven by the lower returns earned by distressed stocks.
The only other paper that focuses on the relation between momentum and credit risk is
Avramov, Chorida, Jostova, and Philipov (2007a) who demonstrate that momentum exists only
in poorly rated firms, and the under performance of poor credit risk firms is driven by the
continuation of low returns for losers. However, Avramov et al.’s (2007a) sample is restricted to
firms that have a credit rating (less than 30% of all firms), and they do not conduct any formal
cross-section tests of the relationship between credit risk and momentum. Surprisingly, the
authors also argue that credit ratings are not the same as default risk, which they suggest is better
proxied by leverage.
Linking size and B/M effects to financial distress is consistent with observed high failure
rates of small and value stocks as such stocks tend to earn higher returns (Fama and French,
1992, 1993; Strong and Xu, 1997). On this basis, we would expect that: 1) distressed stocks earn
4higher returns than non-distressed stocks, and 2) there is no size or value effect in stock returns
once we control for distress risk.
There is substantial evidence that distressed firms earn lower returns than non-distressed
firms. Dichev (1998) finds firms with a high probability of bankruptcy, on average, under
perform low risk firms by 1.2% per month over the period 1980-1995. He concludes such
evidence is hard to reconcile with the pricing of risk in efficient markets and mispricing is a
more likely explanation for such anomalous results. Similarly, Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo
(2001), using the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) financial constraints index, find that even though
financially constrained firms have characteristics associated with higher returns (high leverage,
high B/M, high prior-year returns), they earn lower returns than non-constrained firms. Though
their index does not directly measure financial distress, financially constrained firms are more
likely to face financial distress than non-constrained firms. Griffin and Lemmon (2002),
Ferguson and Shockley (2003), and Campbell et al. (2006) also find distressed firms earn lower
returns. In contrast, Vassalou and Xing (2004), adopting a contingent claims approach, find
distressed firms earn higher returns. However, Garlappi, Shu, and Yan, (2006), using the related
EDF measure provided by Moody’s KMV, find no significant difference in returns between
distressed and non-distressed firms. Nonetheless, none of these studies explore a potential link
between the distress risk and the medium-term continuation of prior returns market anomalies,
the original contribution of this paper.
We employ a widely used accounting ratio based z-score model as a proxy for default
risk as with Dichev (1998), Griffin and Lemmon (2002), and Ferguson and Shockley (2003).2
The main results of our paper are: 1) consistent with a market under reaction story - distress risk
2 Agarwal and Taffler (2007a) suggest that the z-score measure we use performs at least as well as the contingent
claims approach in predicting financial distress.
5appears to have a negative risk premium, 2) the momentum effect in stock returns is proxying for
distress risk and is subsumed by a financial distress factor, and (3) in contrast to the arguments of
Fama and French (1993, 1995), among others, and consistent with Dichev (1998) and Campbell
et al. (2006), there is no evidence to suggest size and B/M are capturing bankruptcy risk.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides our hypotheses, data, and method,
Section III presents our results using time series regressions, and Section IV provides our results
using cross-section regressions. Section V summarizes and discusses our findings.
II. Hypotheses, Data, and Method
This section presents our hypotheses, discusses our sample selection and data, and
describes how we use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and Fama and MacBeth
(1973) method to test our hypotheses.
A. Hypotheses
This paper sets out to determine whether three key market anomalies, size, B/M, and
momentum, can be explained by firm financial distress risk. Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama
and French (1992), among others, argue that smaller firms and high B/M firms are relatively
distressed. Higher returns on such firms are a compensation for this risk (the financial distress
factor hypothesis). On this basis, we expect that: 1) controlling for size (B/M), distressed stocks
will earn a higher return than non-distressed stocks and 2) controlling for distress risk, low
market capitalization (high B/M) firms will not out perform high market capitalization (low
B/M) stocks.
To test the distress factor proposition formally, we establish the following null
hypotheses:
6H10: Distressed stocks do not out perform non-distressed stocks.
H20: Controlling for distress risk, small (high B/M) firms will outperform large
(low B/M) stocks.
If we are able to reject these null hypotheses, then we have evidence, consistent with the
arguments of Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992) that the size and B/M factors
are proxying for bankruptcy risk.
On the other hand, if the market under reacts to financial distress risk (the market under
reaction hypothesis) as Dichev (1998) and others suggest, then we would expect distressed
stocks to under perform non-distressed stocks. In addition, if the medium-term continuation of
returns is due to delays in the market assimilating distress risk, then we would anticipate
momentum only appearing in distressed stocks. To test this market under reaction proposition,
we establish two further null hypotheses:
H30: Distressed stocks do not under perform non-distressed stocks.
H40: Medium-term continuation of returns is the same for distressed and non-
distressed stocks.
B. Sample Selection
This study covers all non-finance industry UK firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) at any time during the period 1979-2002. 3 If a firm changes industry or
exchange of listing, it enters the respective portfolio only after it has been listed on the (main)
3 A firm that belongs to any of the following categories in any month is excluded from the population for that
month: secondary stocks of existing firms, foreign stocks, or firms traded on the Unlisted Securities Market,
7London Stock Exchange and/or is classified as non-financial for twenty-four months. If the
exchange and/or industry changes during the holding period, returns after the change are deleted.
To be included in the sample, firms are required to meet three additional conditions:
1. They should have positive book value because interpretation of negative
book-to-market ratios is problematic. The number of negative book value firms
until 1990 is small (between 1 and 14 per year); although, during the 1990s, the
number of such firms increased ranging from 28 to 53 a year. Almost all negative
book value firms have bankrupt z-scores.4
2. They should have been listed for at least 24 months before the portfolio
formation date due to the data requirement for beta estimation. This constraint
also ensures that only post-listing accounting information is used; and
3. They should have been traded in at least 9 of the 12 months subsequent to
the portfolio formation to circumvent any potential thin trading problem. This rule
does not apply to firms that do not survive the holding period.5
The last month return for firms that enter into bankruptcy (administration, receivership,
or creditors’ voluntary liquidation, etc.) is set to –100% in all but one case.6 To ensure the
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), third market, or over-the-counter. Additionally, a firm that is classified under
Financials or Mining Finance by the London Stock Exchange during any month is also excluded for that month.
4 We repeat all our time series analyses including negative B/M firms and find our results are unchanged. The
results are not reported here for brevity, but are available from the first author.
5 The number of firms excluded is high in the first two years of our sample period and thereafter ranges between 11
and 42 a year. However, the number of financially distressed firms excluded on this criterion is not
disproportionately high.
6 The UK bankruptcy regime differs significantly to Chapter 11 in the U.S. (see Franks, Nyborg, and Torous, 1996
for a detailed analysis) and it is very rare indeed for stockholders to receive any terminal distribution (Kaiser, 1996).
In fact, there was only one case in our sample period, Railtrack, in which equity holders were promised (by the
government) any payout after all creditor claims were met.
8required accounting information is available at the time of portfolio formation, a five-month lag
between the fiscal year-end date and the reporting date is assumed. So, for the portfolio formed
on September 30th, book value of equity and z-score are derived from the latest available
financial statements with fiscal year-end on or before April 30th. 7 The final sample consists of
2,459 firms and a total of 22,774 firm years. The yearly number of stocks in the sample ranges
from a minimum of 810 in 1992 to a maximum of 1,258 in 1981.
C. Data
We use z-score as a proxy for distress risk. Following Altman (1968), the z-score of a
firm is derived as a weighted sum of a set of pre-defined accounting ratios. Firms with z-scores
above a pre-determined cut off rarely fail, while the incidence of failure is high in firms with z-
scores below this cut off. The following UK-based z-score model of Taffler (1983, 1984) and
Agarwal and Taffler (2007b) employed in this study is derived in a similar way to Altman (1968)
using a discriminant modeling approach:
z = 3.20 + 12.18*x1 + 2.50*x2 - 10.68*x3 + 0.029*x4 (1)
where:
x1 = profit before tax (PBT)/current liabilities,
x2 = current assets/total liabilities,
7 We choose September 30th rather than June 30th as the portfolio formation date because unlike in the U.S., in the
UK year-ends are more diffuse. While 37% of the firms in our sample have December year-ends, about the same
number of firms have year-ends between January and April with approximately 22% of the firms having March
year-ends.
9x3 = current liabilities/total assets, and
x4 = no-credit interval computed as (quick assets – current liabilities)/ ((sales
– PBT – depreciation)/365).
Using this bankruptcy model, a firm with a computed z<0 has a financial profile closer to
previously bankrupt firms, thus, making itself at a risk of bankruptcy; whereas, z>0 indicates a
firm not at such risk. The model was developed in 1977; hence, derived z-scores are completely
out-of-sample. An average of 24.5% firms in our sample, each year are classified as being at risk
of bankruptcy.
The accounting data required for z-score and B/M ratio computations is primarily
collected from the Thomson Financial Company Analysis, EXSTAT, MicroEXSTAT, and
DATASTREAM databases, in that order. For a small number of remaining cases, the data is
hand collected from the actual annual reports. This procedure enables us to have complete
coverage of all eligible firms and, as such, the study is free of survivorship bias.
Monthly stock returns, exchange of listing, and firm stock exchange industrial
classifications are collected from the London Business School London Share Price Database
(LSPD). The risk free rates, one-month Treasury bill (T-Bill) rates, are collected from
DATASTREAM.
The list of firm failures is compiled from LSPD (codes 7, 16, and 20), the Stock
Exchange Official Yearbook, published by Waterlow Specialist Information Publishing, and CGT
Capital Losses published by FT Interactive.
D. Method
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To study the link between size, B/M, momentum, and bankruptcy risk, we form several
different portfolios and use both Fama and French (1993) time series and Fama and MacBeth
(1973) cross-sectional regressions. To simplify our analysis, we treat z-score as a binary measure
classifying firms into two categories: 1) those with high risk of bankruptcy (z<0) and 2) those
with low (negligible) risk (z>0).8
We use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to test whether our various
portfolios earn superior returns on a risk-adjusted basis:
Rit – RFt = β1 + β2 (RMt - RFt) + β3 SMBt + β4 HMLt + εit (2)
where:
Rit is the equally-weighted return on Portfolio i during Month t,
RFt is the one-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning of Month t,
RMt is the value-weighted return during Month t of all non-financial stocks listed on the London
Stock Exchange for at least 24 months prior to month t,
SMBt is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during Month t,
HMLt is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor during Month t, and
εit is a mean-zero stochastic error term.
SMB and HML are formed following exactly the same procedure as Fama and French (1993).
To test whether momentum is capturing bankruptcy risk, we also employ Fama and
MacBeth's (1973) cross-section methodology. Following Fama and French (1992) and Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993), our analysis focuses on a three-factor model augmented by z-score and
momentum. The following Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-section regressions are run each month
8 We repeat our time series tests ranking stocks by z-score in our robustness checks in Section IIIe below. Our
results are qualitatively the same.
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from October 1979-September 2003, where the binary variable z(0/1) = 0 if z-score is >0, and =
1 if z-score 0:9
Rit - RFt = it + 1tit-1 + 2t ln(sizeit-1) + 3t ln(B/Mit-1) + 4t Momit-1 + 5t z(0/1)it-1
+ 6t z(0/1)it-1 * Momit-1 + it (3)
where:
Rit is the equally-weighted return on Portfolio i during Month t,
RFt is the one-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning of Month t,
it-1 is the beta of Portfolio i estimated at the portfolio formation date,10
ln(sizeit-1) is the natural logarithm of average market capitalization of common equity of stocks
in Portfolio i at the portfolio formation date, and
ln(B/Mit-1) is the natural logarithm of the average of B/M ratios of stocks in portfolio i at the
portfolio formation date.
The B/M ratio of each stock is computed as book value of equity (excluding preference capital)
plus deferred taxes less minority interests divided by the market capitalization at the time of
portfolio formation. To avoid undue influence of outliers on the regressions, the smallest and
largest 1% of observations are set equal to 0.01 and 0.99 fractiles, respectively.
Momit-1 is the average monthly raw return over the eleven months from October Year t-1 to
August Year t for all the stocks in Portfolio i.
z(0/1)it-1 = 1 if the latest available z-score is negative, 0 otherwise.
εit is a mean-zero stochastic error term.
9 Throughout this paper, subscript "t" represents time of portfolio formation and subscript "t-1" shows that the
information is available at the time of portfolio formation.
10 We estimate portfolio beta by regressing monthly excess returns over the previous 24 months (before portfolio
formation) on each portfolio against monthly excess returns on an equally-weighted market index. We use Dimson’s
(1979) method with one lead and one lag to reduce problems of thin trading.
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III. Distress Risk Factor Proxies
In this section, we first demonstrate that z-score predicts bankruptcy, and then present
preliminary evidence on the relation between prior-year returns, z-scores, size, B/M, and failure
rates. We then explore whether size, B/M, and/or momentum are proxying for distress risk and
conclude that neither size nor B/M is related to bankruptcy risk, whereas continuation of prior-
year returns is.
A. Is Z-Score a Valid Measure of Bankruptcy Risk?
In our sample, the mortality rate (delisting for any reason) is much higher in firms with
negative z-scores than firms with positive z-scores. Approximately 9.4% of all negative z-score
firms are delisted within the next twelve months while the mortality rate for positive z-score
firms is almost half at 5.1%. The difference in proportions is highly significant (z = 11.5). Also,
out of 205 actual bankruptcies, only 11 firms are misclassified as solvent by their z-scores
derived on the basis of last available annual accounts. Our sample comprises of 5,786 firm years
with negative z-scores and 17,791 firm years with positive z-scores. The conditional probability
of failure given a negative z-score is 3.35%, and is significantly different to the base failure rate
of 0.87% (z = 20.4). Similarly, the conditional probability of non-failure given a positive z-score
is 99.94%, and differs significantly to the base rate of 99.13% (z = 11.6). As such, our z-score
variable constitutes a valid ex-ante measure of corporate bankruptcy risk.
B. Size, B/M, Momentum, Z-Scores, and Failure Rates
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To unearth the potential relation between size, B/M, momentum, and distress factor, we
form the following three sets of ten portfolios using two-way sorts:
1. We rank firms on their z-score and group them into two portfolios – one
with negative z-score stocks and the other with positive z-score stocks. Securities
are then independently ranked on their market capitalization on September 30th of
each year and grouped into five portfolios with approximately equal numbers of
securities. Ten portfolios are then formed at the intersections of z-score and
market capitalization.
2. We rank firms on their z-score and group them into two portfolios – one
with negative z-score stocks, and the other with positive z-score stocks. Securities
are then independently ranked on their B/M ratio on September 30th of each year
and grouped into five portfolios with approximately equal numbers of securities.
Ten portfolios are then formed at the intersections of z-score and B/M.
3. We rank firms on their z-score and group them into two portfolios – one
with negative z-score stocks and the other with positive z-score stocks. Securities
are then independently ranked on their prior 11-month returns (i.e., from October
1st of Year t-1 to August 31st of Year t) and grouped into five portfolios with
approximately equal numbers of securities. Ten portfolios are then formed at the
intersections of z-score and prior-year returns.
Table I presents the portfolio-wise distribution of the 205 firms that failed. Panel A
clearly shows that approximately two-thirds of the failures in our sample are in the smallest size
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quintile, and the failure rate drops with increasing firm size. Panel B, similarly, shows that
approximately half of the failed firms are in the highest B/M quintile. Finally, Panel C
demonstrates that half of the failures are in the lowest momentum quintile and there is a
monotonic relationship between momentum and failure rate.
This table provides some preliminary evidence that smaller firms, high B/M firms, and
low prior-year return firms are more likely to fail and, therefore, have higher financial distress
risk. On this basis, each of the three variables is potentially a proxy for a distress risk factor in
stock returns.
Insert Table I about here
C. Size, B/M, and Distress Risk
Panel A of Table II presents summary statistics on our portfolios formed on two-way
sorts on size and z-score, while the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (Equation 2)
regression results are reported in Panel B.
Insert Table II about here
Panel A indicates that distressed firms (z<0) have similar size and B/M ratios to, and
higher betas than, non-distressed firms for each size quintile. Hence, they do not appear to be
less risky than non-distressed firms. Consistent with the market under reaction hypothesis,
distressed stocks have lower prior-year returns than non-distressed stocks in smaller size
portfolios (Quintiles 1 and 2). We are unable to reject null Hypothesis H10 as distressed firms do
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not earn higher returns than non-distressed firms for any size quintile, a result that is consistent
with the evidence of Campbell et al. (2006). There is a strong size effect in both distressed
(0.77% per month, t = 2.27) and non-distressed (0.99% per month, t = 3.74) portfolios. However,
contrary to the evidence of Vassalou and Xing (2004), the difference in size effect for distressed
and non-distressed stocks is not statistically significant (t = 0.88). We are, therefore, unable to
reject null Hypothesis H20, as small firms outperform large firms controlling for distress risk. In
addition, the z-score effect does not appear to be driven by very small stocks as the returns on
distressed (z<0) and non-distressed (z>0) stocks for the smallest size quintile do not differ
significantly (t = 1.30).11
Panel B clearly shows the standard Fama and French (1993) model has a problem in
pricing distressed stocks with the intercepts of three of the five distressed portfolios (2, 3 and 4)
being negative and strongly significant. The small non-distressed portfolio earns anomalously
high returns during our sample period (0.79% per month, t = 5.19); it is these stocks that appear
to be driving the size effect. Distressed stock risk-adjusted returns are significantly lower than
non-distressed stock risk-adjusted returns for all but the largest size quintile, on which basis we
are again unable to reject null Hypothesis H10. Further, small firms significantly outperform
large firms when they are non-distressed (0.90% per month, t = 5.25), and there is also some
similar evidence when they are distressed (0.44% per month, t = 1.72). On this basis we are,
again, unable to reject null Hypothesis H20. Thus, our evidence does not support the argument
that the size effect proxies for distress risk.
11 However, the two size quintiles (2 and 3) with significant z-score effect are still small with average market
capitalization of under £50 million ($90 million) and trading costs could be substantial for these firms.
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Panel A of Table III provides summary statistics for our portfolios formed on two-way
sorts on B/M and z-score, while the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model regression
results are reported in Panel B.
Insert Table III about here
Panel A demonstrates non-distressed stocks are larger than distressed stocks controlling
for B/M. Distressed stocks have higher betas than non-distressed stocks for every B/M quintile,
and there is an inverse and monotonic relationship between B/M and prior-year returns for both
distressed and non-distressed stocks indicating that high B/M stocks are loser stocks. Again, we
find no evidence that distressed stocks earn higher returns than non-distressed stocks and are
unable to reject null Hypothesis H10 for any B/M quintile. Contrary to the distress factor
hypothesis of Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992), controlling for distress risk,
there is a strong B/M effect for non-distressed stocks (1.00% per month, t = 4.55) though it is not
significant for distressed stocks (0.41% per month, t = 1.38). On this basis, we are again unable
to reject null Hypothesis H20, as well. Contrary to Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and Garlappi et
al. (2006), we find our z-score effect is independent of B/M as it is not being driven by any
particular B/M quintile.
Panel B of Table III similarly indicates that, contrary to the distress factor hypothesis,
distressed stocks earn significantly lower returns than non-distressed stocks for all B/M quintiles
except the lowest B/M quintile. As such, we are again unable to reject null Hypothesis H10. The
B/M effect is clearly non-existent in distressed stocks (-0.01% per month, t = 0.04), but it is very
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strong (0.70% per month, t = 4.89) in non-distressed stocks. On this basis, we are unable to reject
null Hypothesis H20 in respect to book-to-market.
Tables II and III, then, do not provide any evidence that higher returns on small stocks
and high B/M stocks are due to such stocks being relatively distressed and, hence, having higher
expected returns. Our findings are consistent with those of Dichev (1998), Ferguson and
Shockley (2003), and Campbell et al. (2006), that size and value premia are not related to the
distress factor.
D. Momentum and Distress Risk
The evidence of Sub-Section C is inconsistent with the distress factor hypothesis for size
and book-to-market effects in stock returns. It also indicates a negative premium for distress risk,
consistent with market under reaction to distress risk in stock prices. If there is under reaction to
such information, we would expect to find a strong relation between momentum and distress
risk. Distressed stocks are likely to be loser stocks that continue to earn lower returns as market
prices slowly incorporate the true solvency position of the firm.12 Panel A of Table IV presents
summary statistics for our portfolios formed on two-way sorts on prior-year returns and z-score,
while Panel B presents the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model regression results.
Insert Table IV about here
Panel A shows that controlling for prior-year returns, distressed stocks are smaller than
non-distressed stocks and have higher B/M ratios. Consistent with the evidence of Lesmond et al.
12 Medium-term continuation of returns may, of course, be driven by factors additional to bankruptcy risk. We
explore this issue explicitly in the next section.
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(2004), both winner and loser stocks are smaller. Importantly, though, null Hypothesis H30, that
distressed stocks earn higher returns than non-distressed stocks, is rejected only for the lowest
momentum quintile (-0.66% per month, t = 3.12). This set of distressed firms is also the smallest
and has the highest B/M ratio. Thus, it is likely to be the most difficult to value by the market
and, consequently, prone to market under reaction (Daniel and Titman, 1999; Lee, 2001). Similar
to Avramov et al. (2007a) for low credit rating firms, the momentum effect is significant only for
distressed stocks (0.65% per month, t = 2.17). On this basis, we are forced to reject null
Hypothesis H40, medium-term continuation of returns is driven by distressed stocks. Our
empirical findings are consistent with momentum and distress risk being related to each other
due to market under reaction to the bankruptcy risk of firms – the market under reaction
hypothesis.
Panel B demonstrates the failure of the Fama and French (1993) model to explain the
returns on low prior-year return distressed portfolios. It also demonstrates that the inability of the
model to explain medium-term continuation of returns (as documented by Fama, 1998;
Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001; Liu, Strong, and Xu, 1999) is due to very negative subsequent
returns on a risk-adjusted basis for distressed loser firms [-0.85% per month (t = 4.56) for the
loser quintile, and –0.55% per month (t = 3.34) for the second lowest quintile]. Again, we reject
null Hypothesis H30 only for the loser portfolio; distressed firms under perform on a risk-
adjusted basis only when their prior-year returns have been low, consistent with under reaction
theory.
Table IV provides clear evidence of medium-term continuation of returns proxying for
distress risk. This market under reaction leads to an apparent negative risk premium on distressed
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stocks, and also to loser stocks remaining losers.13 We again also reject null Hypothesis H40; the
momentum effect is significant only for distressed firms [1.04% per month (t = 3.90) against
0.29% per month (t = 1.49) for non-distressed firms] with the difference also statistically
significant (t = 2.86).
The factor loadings in Equation (2)14 for the three sets of portfolios in Panel B of Tables
II-IV are all consistent with the respective Panel A's: distressed portfolios uniformly have higher
loadings on the three Fama and French (1993) factors than the equivalent non-distressed
portfolios, confirming once again that although they are riskier stocks, they still earn lower
returns.15
E. Robustness Checks
To explore whether z-score has information on a continuous basis or only on a bifurcated
one (positive/negative) as considered in this section, we also form portfolios with finer z-score
granularity and repeat all analyses on this basis. Specifically, each year, we rank our sample
stocks on z-score and divide them into two groups - negative z-score stocks and positive z-score
stocks. Within each group, we then form three portfolios of approximately equal numbers of
securities based on their z-scores. Finally, we independently sort stocks on size (B/M, prior-year
returns) and form three portfolios. Three sets of 18 portfolios result at the intersections of z-score
and size (z-score and B/M, z-score, and prior-year returns). The results of parallel analyses to
Tables I to IV using z-score on this quasi-continuous basis demonstrate that the returns earned by
the three negative z-score portfolios differ little. Neither is there any significant difference in
13 These results that momentum is driven by continuing low returns to losers is consistent with the evidence of
Hong et al. (2000) and Lesmond et al. (2004). However, they are in sharp contrast to Avramov et al. (2007a) who
find their return continuation is primarily driven by low credit-rated winners remaining winners.
14 Not reported here to save space.
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returns across the three positive z-score portfolios.16 Other results are also qualitatively the same.
On this basis, we are justified in working with our simple binary split between distressed
(negative z-score) and non-distressed (positive z-score) stocks.
Garlappi et al. (2006) find that the overall under performance of their distressed firms is
driven by firms with low B/M and at high distress risk. They explain this in terms of violation of
the absolute priority rule in debt renegotiations. In contrast, we find that our lower returns to
distressed stocks are not driven by low B/M firms at acute risk of bankruptcy. This is not
surprising given that violation of absolute priority in the creditor-friendly UK bankruptcy regime
is a very rare event indeed.
IV. Size, B/M, Momentum, and Z-Scores: Cross-Sectional Evidence
The evidence so far indicates there is a link between momentum and bankruptcy risk,
although this pattern may be being somewhat obscured by the size and B/M factors. As such, we
need to conduct multivariate analysis to disentangle the underlying relations. To explore the
relation between size, B/M, prior-year returns, and z-score in more detail, we form 24 portfolios
by four-way sorts as follows: at the end of September of each year, we first rank firms on their
market capitalization and group them into two portfolios using the median as the break point.
The stocks are then independently ranked on B/M and grouped into three portfolios – one with
the lowest 30%, one with the middle 40%, and one with the highest 30% B/M ratios. Securities
are then separately ranked on momentum and grouped into two portfolios using the median as
the break point and, finally, the stocks are independently ranked on z-score and grouped into two
portfolios – one with negative z-score stocks and the other with positive z-score stocks. Twenty-
15 Campbell et al. (2006) find the same results in the U.S.
16 These results are not reported here to save space, but are available from the first author.
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four size, B/M, momentum, and z-score portfolios are then formed at the intersections of the two
market capitalization, three B/M portfolios, two momentum and two z-score portfolios.17
A. Summary Statistics
Table V presents the failure rates and distribution of failures for our 24 portfolios formed
on size, B/M, momentum, and z-score. Panel A demonstrates that for negative z-score stocks,
controlling for size and B/M, small low prior-year return stocks are more likely to fail than small
high prior-year return stocks. Also, controlling for size and prior-year return, there is a U-shaped
relationship between failure rates and B/M. Interestingly, Panel B highlights that 43.5% of the
failures are negative z-score, low momentum, small stocks with high B/M ratios, while such
stocks, in fact, constitute just 5.4% of our sample. The table suggests that all three factors could
be related to financial distress in some way and, thus, formal cross-sectional analysis is required
to disentangle the inter-relationships.
Insert Table V about here
Table VI presents the characteristics of the 24 portfolios formed by our four-way sorts.
Panel A provides evidence of medium-term continuation of returns for all the distressed
portfolios (z<0) controlling for size and B/M. There is no evidence of momentum for high B/M
non-distressed stocks (z>0). It also shows that, controlling for size and B/M, distressed stocks
underperform non-distressed stocks for low prior-year return portfolios (except for small size,
17 Fama (1998) points out that the results of many return predictability studies are sensitive to the trading rules
employed. To test the robustness of our results, we repeat all our analyses using an alternative portfolio formation
method which avoids potential data-snooping bias (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). Twenty-four size, B/M, and z-score
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low B/M stocks). Panel B demonstrates distressed stocks have higher betas than non-distressed
stocks, controlling for size, B/M, and prior-year return, showing firms with higher bankruptcy
risk tend to have higher sensitivity to market movements. Thus, the first two panels of Table VI
provide preliminary evidence of the momentum effect being driven by distressed stocks, once the
effects of size and B/M on stock returns are controlled for.
Insert Table VI about here
Panels C and D of Table VI demonstrate we are largely successful in controlling for size
and B/M effects in our portfolio sorts. Panel E presents higher stock return variability for
distressed stocks. Such stocks exhibit lower prior-year returns than non-distressed stocks for
loser portfolios, and higher prior-year returns for winner portfolios.
B. The Relation between Momentum and Distress Risk: Regression Evidence
Table VII presents the results for our Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-section regressions
for the 24 portfolios formed on four-way sorts using Equation (3). It indicates that negative z-
score stocks earn lower returns than positive z-score stocks (Models (i), (iii), (v) and (vi)), and
the coefficient on the z-score binary measure becomes stronger when size, B/M, and prior-year
returns are present in the pricing equation.18
portfolios are formed at the intersections of the independently sorted four market capitalization, three B/M, and two
z-score portfolios. Results are essentially identical to our main findings and, thus, not reported here to save space.
18 The respective coefficients on the z-score binary measure are -0.24% per month in Model (i), -0.29% per month
in Model (iii) and -0.28% per month in Model (v). This result is also consistent with the findings of Dichev (1998)
with respect to size and B/M. Ferguson and Shockley (2003) also find high z-score firms earn higher returns than
low z-score firms.
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Insert Table VII about here
The results [Model (v)] show that, conditional on beta, size, B/M, and prior-year returns,
negative z-score portfolios under perform positive z-score portfolios by 28 basis points per
month, a difference that is statistically significant (t = 2.34). As such, we are unable to reject null
Hypothesis H10 that distressed firms do not earn higher returns than non-distressed firms.
However, we reject companion null Hypothesis H30, that distressed firms do not under perform
non-distressed firms. There is little evidence of any size effect (save in Model (iv) when z-score
is omitted, but momentum included), while high B/M stocks out perform low B/M stocks by 37
basis points per month [Model (v)], a difference that is highly statistically significant (t = 3.45).
The presence of z-score in the pricing equation has no influence on either of the size or B/M
coefficients [Models (ii) and (iii)] indicating there is no common variation between financial
distress risk, size, or B/M that is linked to stock returns, leading to rejection of null Hypothesis
H20 (i.e., controlling for distress risk, small (high B/M) firms outperform large (low B/M)
firms)19 The coefficient on momentum is 11 basis points per month (t = 3.12) when z-score is
excluded from the pricing equation [Model (iv)]. Importantly, the coefficient on momentum
becomes statistically insignificant (5 basis points; t = 1.23) when z-score is included in the
pricing equation [Model (v)]. This clearly shows that medium-term continuation of returns is
proxying for distress risk and makes no material contribution to explaining the cross-section of
stock returns once an explicit proxy for distress risk is incorporated in the pricing equation.
19 Our results are consistent with Dichev (1998) and Ferguson and Shockley (2003). Vassalou and Xing (2004) find
contrary results using an option-based approach for assessing the probability of default although their model is
problematic (see Bharath and Shumway (2004)). Also, Da and Gao (2006) find that Vassalou and Xing's (2004)
results are due to first month returns reversal.
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Finally, to test null Hypothesis H40 (i.e., whether medium-term continuation of returns is
driven by distressed stocks), we introduce an interaction dummy between momentum and z-
score [Model (vi)]. We find that there is no momentum effect for non-distressed stocks (0.01%
per month, t = 0.20); however, there is a strong effect for distressed firms of 0.08% per month
with the difference highly significant (t = 2.61), leading to the rejection of null Hypothesis H40.
The results of Table VII strongly confirm our earlier results that medium-term continuation of
returns is proxying for distress risk and is being driven by financially distressed firms. Avramov
et al. (2007a) argue that momentum profits are not fully explained by credit risk, though no
formal tests for this proposition are conducted. However, we find, in contrast, that when a
distress factor is added to the asset pricing equation, the momentum factor is no longer
significant. Our results are inconsistent with the distress factor hypothesis, but in line with the
market under reaction to bankruptcy risk hypothesis.
V. Concluding Remarks
Consistent with Dichev (1998), and Campbell et al. (2006), we find that, contrary to the
distress factor hypothesis, financially distressed stocks earn lower returns than non-distressed
stocks, and size and B/M effects are not related to distress risk in the UK. These results are hard
to reconcile with rational asset pricing as such financially distressed stocks are riskier on
conventional measures (have higher betas, higher B/Ms, and are smaller).
However, the primary contribution of this paper is to provide a potential distress factor
explanation for the momentum anomaly. There is a lack of consensus in the existing literature on
whether continuation of prior returns is due to risk or market under reaction to new information.
Our empirical results argue a market under reaction story; the market is unable to appropriately
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assimilate bad news (e.g., Barberis et al., 1998). This leads to continuing under performance of
financially distressed firms and drives the medium-term continuation of stock returns. Consistent
with this hypothesis, we find that more than half of the bankruptcies in our sample fall in the
lowest momentum quintile, the stocks of financially distressed firms (which are also poor past
performers) earn lower subsequent returns, and our bankruptcy risk proxy, z-score, drives out
momentum in the cross-section. Avramov et al. (2007a) find that low credit-rated stocks drive
stock momentum. However, they do not test for whether credit rating fully explains momentum
in the cross-section. Further, they argue that leverage is a better proxy for distress risk than credit
rating, and, as such, distinguish between credit risk and financial distress risk. We disagree with
this distinction. In our view, credit risk and financial distress risk are synonymous. Our results
demonstrate it is the market mispricing of underlying bankruptcy risk that is driving the medium-
term continuation of returns. As such, we interpret Avramov et al.’s (2007a) results as consistent
with ours.
Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004) explain significant under performance of UK firms to first
time going-concern audit reports in terms of investor denial of their implications for firm
financial distress. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) use similar arguments to explain under
performance after bond downgradings. Similarly, Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov
(2007b) find that deterioration in financial and operating performance of low grade stocks after
ratings downgrades is largely unanticipated by the market leading to subsequent stock price
under performance.
Nonetheless, there is an alternative market microstructure explanation for our findings.
Low returns on distressed stocks may not represent an arbitrage opportunity because as Grinblatt
and Han (2005) argue, arbitrageurs’ actual ability to exploit market mispricing is restricted due
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to unpredictable fundamental values, short time horizon, and limited capital availability.
Lesmond et al. (2004), for example, suggest that the momentum anomaly cannot be exploited by
investors as it is driven by small illiquid stocks which cannot be easily shorted. Similarly, Taffler
et al. (2004) find profitable opportunities to arbitrage under performance of going-concern stocks
are severely limited due to high trading costs. Houge and Loughran (2006) find that small cap
growth and value mutual funds earn similar returns even during periods of strong value effect for
small firms and argue this is due to lack of liquidity. Avramov et al. (2007b) demonstrate that
their ratings downgrade market under reaction results are driven by their worst-rated stocks
comprising just 4% of total market capitalization. Nevertheless, whether we explain our
empirical findings with a market under reaction or market microstructure story, our results
demonstrate that financial distress risk drives out the momentum effect in stock returns.
27
REFERENCES
Agarwal, V. and R.J. Taffler, 2007a, “A Comparative Analysis of Market-Based and
Accounting-Based Models for the Prediction of Corporate Failure,” Journal of Banking and
Finance, forthcoming.
Agarwal, V. and R.J. Taffler, 2007b, “Twenty-Five Years of the Taffler Z-Score Model: Does it
Really have Predictive Ability?” Accounting and Business Research 37, 285-300.
Altman, E.I., 1968, “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate
Bankruptcy,” Journal of Finance 23, 589-609.
Avramov, D., T. Chordia, G. Jostova, and A. Philipov, 2007a, “Momentum and Credit Rating,”
Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Avramov, D., T. Chordia, G. Jostova and A. Philipov, 2007b, “Credit Ratings and the Cross-
Section of Stock Returns,” University of Maryland Working Paper.
Barberis, N., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1998, “A Model of Investor Sentiment,” Journal of
Financial Economics 49, 307-343.
Beaver, W.H., 1968, “Market Prices, Financial Ratios, and the Prediction of Failure,” Journal of
Accounting Research 6, 179-192.
28
Bharath, S.T. and T. Shumway, 2004, “Forecasting Default with the KMV-Merton Model,”
University of Michigan Business School Working Paper.
Campbell, J., J. Hilscher, and J. Szilagyi, 2006, “In Search of Distress Risk,” Harvard Institute of
Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2081.
Chan, K. and N. Chen, 1991, “Structural and Return Characteristics of Small and Large Firms,”
Journal of Finance 46, 1467-1484.
Da, Z. and P. Gao, 2006, “Clientele Change, Liquidity Shock, and the Return on Financially
Distressed Stocks,” Kellogg School of Management Working Paper.
Daniel, K. and S. Titman, 1999, “Market Efficiency in an Irrational World,” Financial Analyst
Journal 55, 28-40.
Dichev, I.D., 1998, “Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk?” Journal of Finance 53, 1131-
1147.
Dichev, I.D. and J. Piotroski, 2001, “Long Run Stock Returns Following Bond Ratings
Changes,” Journal of Finance 56, 173-203.
Dimson, E., 1979, “Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading,” Journal
of Financial Economics 7, 197-226.
29
Fama, E.F., 1998, “Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns and Behavioural Finance,” Journal of
Financial Economics 49, 283-306.
Fama E.F. and K.R. French, 1992, “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns,” Journal of
Finance 47, 427-465.
Fama E.F. and K.R. French, 1993, “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds,”
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56.
Fama E.F. and K.R. French, 1995, “Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns,”
Journal of Finance 50, 131-155.
Fama, E. and J.D. MacBeth, 1973, “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests,” Journal of
Political Economy 81, 607-636.
Ferguson, M.F. and R.L. Shockley, 2003, “Equilibrium ‘Anomalies’,” Journal of Finance 58,
2549-2580.
Franks, J.R., K.G. Nyborg, and W.N. Torous, 1996, “A Comparison of U.S., UK, and German
Insolvency Codes”, Financial Management 25, 86-101.
30
Garlappi, L., T. Shu, and H. Yan, 2006, “Default Risk, Shareholder Advantage, and Stock
Returns,” University of Texas at Austin Working Paper.
Griffin, J. and L. Lemmon, 2002, “Book-to-Market Equity, Distress Risk, and Stock Returns,”
Journal of Finance 57, 2317-2336.
Grinblatt, M. and B. Han, 2005, “Prospect Theory, Mental Accounting, and Momentum,”
Journal of Financial Economics 78, 311-339.
Hong, H., T. Lim, and J. Stein, 2000, “Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage, and
the Profitability of Momentum Strategies,” Journal of Finance 55, 265-295.
Houge, T. and T. Loughran, 2006, “Do Investors Capture the Value Premium?” Financial
Management (Summer), 5-19.
Jegadeesh, N. and S. Titman, 1993, “Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers:
Implications for Stock Market Efficiency,” Journal of Finance 48, 65-91.
Jegadeesh, N. and S. Titman, 2001, “Profitability of Momentum Strategies: An Evaluation of
Alternative Explanations,” Journal of Finance 56, 699-720.
Kaplan, S. and L. Zingales, 1997, “Do Financing Constraints Explain Why Investment is
Correlated with Cash Flow?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 168-216.
31
Kaiser, K., 1996, “European Bankruptcy Laws: Implications for Corporations Facing Financial
Distress”, Financial Management 25, 67-85.
Lamont, O., C. Polk, and J. Saa-Requejo, 2001, “Financial Constraints and Stock Returns,” The
Review of Financial Studies 14, 529-554.
Lee, C.M.C., 2001, “Market Efficiency and Accounting Research: A Discussion of ‘Capital
Market Research in Accounting’ by S.P. Kothari", Journal of Accounting and Economics 31,
233-253.
Lesmond, D., M. Schill, and C. Zhou, 2004, “The Illusory Nature of Momentum Profits,”
Journal of Financial Economics 71, 349-380.
Liu, W., N. Strong, and X. Xu, 1999, “The Profitability of Momentum Investing,” Journal of
Business Finance and Accounting 26, 1043-1091.
Lo, A.W. and C.A. MacKinlay, 1990, “Data Snooping in Tests of Financial Asset Pricing
Models,” Review of Financial Studies 10, 431-467.
Strong, N. and Z. Xu, 1997, “Explaining the Cross-Section of UK Expected Stock Returns,”
British Accounting Review 29, 1-23.
32
Taffler, R.J., 1983, “The Assessment of Company Solvency and Performance Using a Statistical
Model,” Accounting and Business Research 15, 295-307.
Taffler, R.J., 1984, “Empirical Models for the Monitoring of UK Corporations,” Journal of
Banking and Finance 8, 199-227.
Taffler, R.J., J. Lu, and A. Kausar, 2004, “In Denial? Stock Market Underreaction to Going
Concern Audit Report Disclosures,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 38, 263-296.
Vassalou, M. and Y. Xing, 2004, “Default Risk in Equity Returns,” Journal of Finance 59, 831-
868.
33
Table I: Failure Rates in Two-Way Portfolios
Portfolios in Panel A are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979-2002, all the stocks in our sample
are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. The stocks are also
independently ranked on market capitalization and grouped into five portfolios. Ten portfolios are then formed at the
intersections of size and z-score. Portfolios in Panel B are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979-
2002, all the stocks in our sample are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or
positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on B/M and grouped into five portfolios. Ten portfolios are then formed at the
intersections of B/M and z-score. B/M is computed as the ratio of book value of equity (excluding preference capital) plus
deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available financial statements, divided by the market value of equity on
September 30th. Portfolios in Panel C are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979-2002, all the stocks
in our sample are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. The stocks are
also independently ranked on momentum and grouped into five portfolios. Ten portfolios are then formed at the intersections of
momentum and z-score. Momentum is defined as the 11-month return from October 1st of Year t-1-August 31st of Year t.
Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The list of failures is compiled
from LSPD, The Stock Exchange Official Yearbook and CGT Capital Losses.
% of Firms
with z<0
Distribution of Failures (%) Failure Rate (%)
z<0 z>0 Total z<0 z>0 Total
Panel A. Size and z-Score Portfolios
Small 38.4 64.4 3.4 67.8 6.5 0.2 2.6
2 28.7 16.6 1.0 17.6 2.6 0.1 0.8
3 21.7 9.3 0.0 9.3 2.0 0.0 0.4
4 17.2 2.9 0.5 3.4 0.8 0.0 0.2
Big 14.8 1.5 0.5 2.0 0.4 0.0 0.1
Total 24.5 94.6 5.4 100.0 3.4 0.1 0.9
Panel B. B/M and z-Score Portfolios
Low 25.7 13.7 0.0 13.7 2.3 0.0 0.6
2 19.6 12.7 1.5 14.1 2.8 0.1 0.6
3 19.5 11.2 1.0 12.2 2.5 0.1 0.5
4 24.2 10.7 0.5 11.2 1.9 0.0 0.5
High 33.7 46.3 2.4 48.8 6.0 0.2 2.1
Total 24.5 94.6 5.4 100.0 3.4 0.1 0.9
Panel C. Prior-Year Returns and z-Score Portfolios
Low 35.0 49.8 2.0 51.7 6.2 0.1 2.2
2 21.7 14.1 1.0 15.1 2.8 0.1 0.7
3 19.6 11.2 0.5 11.7 2.5 0.0 0.5
4 19.9 9.8 0.5 10.2 2.1 0.0 0.4
High 26.4 9.8 1.5 11.2 1.6 0.1 0.5
Total 24.5 94.6 5.4 100.0 3.4 0.1 0.9
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Table II: Size and Distress Risk in Stock Returns
Portfolios are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979-2002, all the stocks in our sample are allocated
to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on
market capitalization and grouped into five portfolios. Ten portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size and z-score. For
each size quintile, an arbitrage portfolio labeled “difference”, long on distressed stocks and short on non-distressed stocks, is also
formed. Panel A presents the portfolio summary statistics. B/M is computed as the ratio of book value of equity (excluding
preference capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available accounts divided by the market value of
equity on September 30th. Average monthly excess return is the time series average of the difference between monthly stock
returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate observed at the beginning of the month. Portfolio betas are the sum of slopes in the
regression of the return on a portfolio on the current, prior, and next month’s market returns. Average size, average B/M, and
average momentum are the time series averages of monthly averages of market capitalizations, B/M, and prior 11-month returns
(excluding September), respectively for stocks in the portfolio at the end of September of each year. Panel B presents the
intercepts and adjusted R2 for each of the portfolios from the following Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (Equation 2):
Rit – RFt = β1 + β2 (RMt - RFt) + β3 SMBt + β4 HMLt + εit
where Rit is the equally-weighted return on Portfolio i during Month t, RFt is the one-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning of
Month t, and RMt is the value-weighted return during Month t of all non-financial stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange for
at least 24 months prior to Month t. SMBt is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during Month t, and HMLt is
the return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor during Month t. εit is a mean-zero stochastic error term. SMB and HML
are formed following exactly the same procedure as Fama and French (1993). Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last
monthly return for failed stocks is set equal to –100%. Figures in brackets are the t-statistics.
Panel A. Summary Statistics









z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 Difference
Small 5.0 5.6 1.67 1.68 0.21 1.25 1.07 0.85 1.17 1.44 -0.27(2.94) (5.11) (1.30)
2 17.5 17.9 1.23 1.18 1.32 1.53 1.16 0.96 0.15 0.68 -0.54(0.39) (2.38) (3.11)
3 46.7 48.0 1.05 0.89 1.86 1.70 1.33 1.01 0.22 0.72 -0.49(0.55) (2.43) (2.66)
4 143.7 145.7 0.79 0.74 2.30 1.98 1.31 1.08 0.21 0.49 -0.28(0.55) (1.62) (1.62)





Panel B. Fama and French (1993) Regression Results
Size Intercept (β1) Adjusted R
2
z<0 z>0 Difference z<0 z>0 Difference
Small 0.23 0.79 -0.56 0.77 0.78 0.23(1.19) (5.90) (-2.99)
2 -0.78 -0.05 -0.73 0.87 0.93 0.17(-5.58) (-0.59) (-4.55)
3 -0.68 -0.02 -0.67 0.84 0.93 0.19(-4.14) (-0.21) (-3.90)
4 -0.64 -0.19 -0.45 0.82 0.90 0.15(-3.75) (-1.98) (-2.75)
Big -0.21 -0.11 -0.10 0.83 0.93 0.00(-1.43) (-1.24) (-0.68)
Small - Big 0.44 0.90 -0.46 0.46 0.60 0.13(1.72) (5.25) (1.90)
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Table III: B/M and Distress Risk in Stock Returns
Portfolios are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979-2002, all the stocks in our sample are allocated
to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on
B/M and grouped into five portfolios. Ten portfolios are then formed at the intersections of B/M and z-score. For each B/M
quintile, an arbitrage portfolio labeled “difference”, long on distressed stocks and short on non-distressed stocks, is also formed.
Panel A presents the portfolio summary statistics. B/M is computed as the ratio of book value of equity (excluding preference
capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available accounts divided by the market value of equity on
September 30th. Average monthly excess return is the time series average of the difference between monthly stock returns and
the one-month Treasury bill rate observed at the beginning of the month. Portfolio betas are the sum of slopes in the regression of
the return on a portfolio on the current, prior, and next month’s market returns. Average size, average B/M, and average
momentum are the time series averages of monthly averages of market capitalizations, B/M, and prior 11-month returns
(excluding September), respectively for stocks in the portfolio at the end of September of each year. Panel B presents the
intercepts and adjusted R2 for each of the portfolios from the following Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (Equation 2):
Rit – RFt = β1 + β2 (RMt - RFt) + β3 SMBt + β4 HMLt + εit
where Rit is the equally-weighted return on Portfolio i during Month t, RFt is the 1-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning of
Month t and RMt is the value-weighted return during Month t of all non-financial stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange for
at least 24 months prior to Month t. SMBt is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during Month t and HMLt is
the return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor during Month t. εit is a mean-zero stochastic error term. SMB and HML
are formed following exactly the same procedure as Fama and French (1993). Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last
monthly return for failed stocks is set equal to –100%. Figures in brackets are the t-statistics.
Panel A. Summary Statistics









z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 Difference
Low 549.85 927.47 0.24 0.26 3.68 3.27 1.22 1.09 0.45 0.26 0.20(1.09) (0.77) (0.97)
2 639.92 691.27 0.53 0.54 1.94 2.19 1.14 1.01 0.05 0.44 -0.39(0.15) (1.55) (-1.90)
3 448.52 477.16 0.81 0.81 1.45 1.60 1.08 0.96 0.48 0.72 -0.24(1.26) (2.52) (-1.21)
4 189.39 420.13 1.21 1.20 0.86 1.09 1.13 0.94 0.65 1.06 -0.41(1.88) (3.65) (-2.40)





Panel B. Fama and French (1993) Regression Results
B/M Intercept (β1) Adjusted R
2
z<0 z>0 Difference z<0 z>0 Difference
Low -0.24 -0.25 0.02 0.79 0.91 0.19(-1.21) (-2.53) (0.10)
2 -0.78 -0.17 -0.61 0.75 0.93 0.11(-4.09) (-2.13) (-3.10)
3 -0.40 0.03 -0.43 0.79 0.92 0.12(-2.25) (0.34) (-2.27)
4 -0.22 0.30 -0.52 0.80 0.91 0.05(-1.41) (3.25) (-3.05)
High -0.24 0.45 -0.69 0.82 0.88 0.24(-1.38) (4.48) (-3.64)
High - Low -0.01 0.70 -0.71 0.29 0.60 0.07(-0.04) (4.89) (-2.69)
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Table IV: Prior-Year Returns and Distress Risk in Stock Returns
Portfolios are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979-2002, all the stocks in our sample are allocated
to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on
prior-year returns and grouped into five portfolios. Ten portfolios are then formed at the intersections of prior-year returns and z-
score. For each prior-year returns quintile, an arbitrage portfolio labeled “difference”, long on distressed stocks and short on non-
distressed stocks, is also formed. Panel A presents the portfolio summary statistics. B/M is computed as the ratio of book value of
equity (excluding preference capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available accounts divided by the
market value of equity on September 30th. Average monthly excess return is the time series average of the difference between
monthly stock returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate observed at the beginning of the month. Portfolio betas are the sum of
slopes in the regression of the return on a portfolio on the current, prior, and next month’s market returns. Average size, average
B/M, and average momentum are the time series averages of monthly averages of market capitalizations, B/M, and prior 11-
month returns (excluding September), respectively for stocks in the portfolio at the end of September of each year. Panel B
presents the intercepts and adjusted R2 for each of the portfolios from the following Fama and French (1993) three-factor model
(Equation 2):
Rit – RFt = β1 + β2 (RMt - RFt) + β3 SMBt + β4 HMLt + εit
where Rit is the equally-weighted return on Portfolio i during Month t, RFt is the one-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning of
Month t, and RMt is the value-weighted return during Month t of all non-financial stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange for
at least 24 months prior to Month t. SMBt is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during Month t, and HMLt is
the return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor during Month t. εit is a mean-zero stochastic error term. SMB and HML
are formed following exactly the same procedure as Fama and French (1993). Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last
monthly return for failed stocks is set equal to –100%. Figures in brackets are the t-statistics.















z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 Difference
Loser 151.4 360.1 1.74 1.41 -3.79 -2.89 1.04 0.98 0.24 0.90 -0.66(0.57) (2.67) (-3.12)
2 372.9 516.6 1.28 1.11 -0.07 -0.03 1.05 0.91 0.36 0.67 -0.31(0.99) (2.33) (-1.69)
3 558.8 733.2 1.06 0.97 1.51 1.51 1.04 0.93 0.57 0.64 -0.06(1.63) (2.39) (-0.34)
4 568.4 626.5 0.99 0.87 3.06 3.06 1.12 1.01 0.77 0.64 0.13(2.32) (2.31) (0.83)





Panel B. Fama and French (1993) Regression Results
Prior-Year
Return
Intercept (β1) Adjusted R2
z<0 z>0 Difference z<0 z>0 Difference
Loser -0.85 -0.01 -0.84 0.81 0.86 0.10(-4.56) (-0.06) (-4.15)
2 -0.55 -0.05 -0.50 0.81 0.91 0.13(-3.34) (-0.54) (-2.89)
3 -0.23 0.02 -0.25 0.79 0.92 0.15(-1.42) (0.21) (-1.45)
4 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.79 0.92 0.07(0.17) (0.49) (-0.09)
Winner 0.19 0.29 -0.10 0.81 0.87 0.18(1.02) (2.42) (-0.63)
Winner - Loser 1.04 0.29 0.74 0.24 0.27 0.01(3.90) (1.49) (2.86)
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Table V: Failure Rates in Four-Way Portfolios
At the end of September of each year from 1979-2002, all the stocks in our sample are ranked on market capitalization and
grouped into two portfolios, independently ranked on B/M, and grouped into three portfolios, independently ranked on prior-year
returns and grouped into two portfolios and, finally, separately allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-
score is negative or positive. Twenty-four portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size, B/M, momentum, and z-score.
Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The list of failures is compiled
from LSPD, The Stock Exchange Official Yearbook and CGT Capital Losses.
Size Prior-YearReturn
Low B/M Medium B/M High B/M
z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0
Panel A. Failure Rates (%)
Small Low 6.7 0.0 4.0 0.0 6.9 0.2
Small High 3.5 0.1 1.9 0.2 2.6 0.0
Big Low 1.8 0.2 0.5 0.0 1.3 0.0
Big High 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.5 0.0
Panel B. Distribution of Failures (%)
Small Low 12.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 43.5 2.5
Small High 8.5 0.5 5.0 1.5 7.0 0.0
Big Low 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.5 0.0
Big High 1.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.0 0.0
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Table VI: Summary Statistics – Size, B/M, Momentum and z-score Portfolios
At the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2002, all the stocks in our sample are ranked on market capitalization and
grouped into two portfolios, independently ranked on B/M and grouped into three portfolios and independently ranked on prior-
year return and grouped into two portfolios. The stocks are also independently allocated to two groups based on whether their
latest available z-score is negative or positive. Twenty-four portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size, B/M,
momentum and z-score. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year. B/M is computed as the ratio of book value
of equity (excluding preference capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available accounts divided by
the market value of equity on September 30th. Average monthly excess return is the time series average of the difference
between monthly stock returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate observed at the beginning of the month. Portfolio betas are
the sum of slopes in the regression of the return on a portfolio on the current, prior, and next month’s market returns. Average
size, average B/M, and average momentum are the time series averages of monthly averages of market capitalizations, B/M and
prior 11-month average monthly returns (October Year t-1-August Year t), respectively for stocks in the portfolio at the end of
September of each year. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last monthly return for failed stocks is set equal to –100%.
Size Prior-Year Return
Low B/M Medium B/M High B/M
z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0 z<0 z>0
Panel A. Average Excess Monthly Returns (%)
Small Low 0.56 0.45 0.28 1.04 0.51 1.26
High 0.68 1.09 0.90 0.92 1.69 1.24
Large Low -0.43 -0.04 -0.14 0.39 0.59 1.10
High 0.32 0.35 0.67 0.71 1.04 1.05
Panel B. Average Beta
Small Low 0.95 1.03 0.99 0.92 1.06 0.89
High 1.36 1.05 1.29 1.01 1.11 1.00
Large Low 0.93 0.90 1.01 0.86 1.18 0.94
High 1.34 1.01 1.09 0.95 1.49 0.97
Panel C. Average Market Capitalization (£m)
Small Low 14.6 25.3 14.7 20.0 10.5 13.2
High 18.8 23.9 15.9 19.1 11.4 13.3
Large Low 1,048.1 1,135.3 958.4 1,048.9 516.5 1,137.7
High 1,065.1 931.6 880.8 906.2 922.9 1,416.0
Panel D. Average B/M
Small Low 0.32 0.37 0.87 0.86 2.44 2.19
High 0.29 0.35 0.84 0.83 1.94 2.08
Large Low 0.31 0.35 0.82 0.81 2.00 1.77
High 0.29 0.32 0.80 0.78 1.61 1.72
Panel E. Average Monthly Prior-Year Monthly Returns (%)
Small Low -1.61 -0.79 -1.83 -0.85 -2.57 -1.35
High 6.51 5.44 4.80 4.19 4.02 3.76
Large Low -0.47 -0.14 -0.79 -0.38 -1.81 -0.92
High 5.28 4.28 3.74 3.39 4.16 3.09
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Table VII: Cross-Section Regression Results
At the end of September of each year from 1979-2002, all the stocks in our sample are ranked on market capitalization and
grouped into two portfolios, independently ranked on B/M, and grouped into three portfolios and independently ranked on prior-
year return and grouped into two portfolios. The stocks are also independently allocated to two groups based on whether their
latest available z-score is negative or positive. Twenty-four portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size, B/M,
momentum, and z-score. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year. B/M is computed as the ratio of book value
of equity (excluding preference capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available accounts divided by
the market value of equity on September 30th. To avoid undue influence of outliers on the regressions, the smallest and largest
1% of the observations on B/M are set equal to 0.01 and 0.99 fractiles, respectively. Portfolio betas are the sum of slopes in the
regression of the return on a portfolio on the current, prior and following month’s market returns. The estimated Fama-MacBeth
(1973) regression equation is:
Rit - RFt = it + 1tit-1 + 2t ln(sizeit-1) + 3t ln(B/Mit-1) + 4t Momit-1+ 5t z(0/1)it-1+ 6t Momit-1* z(0/1)it-1
where Rit is the equally-weighted return on Portfolio i during Month t and RFt is the one-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning
of Month t. it-1 is the beta of Portfolio i estimated at the portfolio formation date. ln(sizeit-1) and ln(B/Mit-1) are the natural
logarithms of average of market capitalizations and average of B/M ratios, respectively of stocks in Portfolio i at the portfolio
formation date. Momit-1 is the average monthly return over the 11 months from October year t-1 to August year t prior to the
month of portfolio formation of all the stocks in Portfolio i. z(0/1)it-1 is equal to one if the latest available z-score is negative, 0
otherwise. The slopes are estimated by Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-section regressions for each of the 288 months from October
1979-September 2003. Figures in brackets are the respective t-statistics. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last period return
for failed stocks is set equal to –100%.





2.28 -0.07 -0.08 0.28
(2.44) (0.39) (1.59) (2.88)
(iii)
2.19 0.01 -0.07 0.31 -0.29
(2.33) (0.05) (1.41) (3.19) (2.50)
(iv)
2.73 -0.23 -0.11 0.36 0.11
(2.88) (0.82) (2.12) (3.43) (3.12)
(v)
2.11 -0.01 -0.07 0.37 0.05 -0.28
(2.15) (0.05) (1.46) (3.45) (1.23) (2.34)
(vi)
2.17 -0.04 -0.07 0.37 0.01 -0.31 0.07
(2.22) (0.11) (1.49) (3.48) (0.20) (2.25) (2.61)
